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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
plaintiffs-appellants

Oracle

International

Corporation,

Oracle

Systems

Corporation, Oracle USA Inc., Oracle EMEA Limited, J.D. Edwards Europe
Limited, and Siebel Systems, Inc. state that Oracle Corporation wholly owns each
of them, either directly or through one or more of its privately-held wholly owned
subsidiaries.

No other publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of any

plaintiff-appellant’s stock.
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In this case, plaintiffs-appellants Oracle International Corporation, Oracle
USA Inc., and Siebel Systems, Inc. (collectively, “Oracle”) obtained a $1.3 billion
jury verdict against defendants-appellees SAP AG, SAP America Inc.,
TomorrowNow Inc. (“TN”; and collectively, “SAP”) for an admitted, three-yearlong campaign of copyright infringement built upon millions of illegal downloads
from Oracle’s password-protected computer systems.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (Hamilton, J.)
then issued post-trial orders that set aside that verdict, granted SAP judgment as a
matter of law on any hypothetical license measure of actual damages, granted SAP
a new trial if Oracle rejected a $272 million remittitur, and limited any such new
trial to lost profits and infringer’s profits as Oracle’s sole remedy. In so doing, the
district court rejected the jury’s findings that Oracle had demonstrated that $1.3
billion represented the fair market value that the parties would have agreed upon
had they bargained for a license authorizing SAP’s infringing use, and that this
valuation was a better measure of Oracle’s damages than lost profits and/or
infringer’s profits.
Those post-trial rulings were in error. The value of a hypothetical license is
a long-accepted measure of actual damages under the Copyright Act where, as
here, it is based on objective evidence. Contrary to the district court’s post-trial
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orders, the availability of such damages does not depend on a showing of actual
willingness to license or comparable “benchmark” licenses.

And Oracle’s

evidence of such damages here, including SAP’s own recorded projections of the
value of the infringed material at the time of the infringement, was both objective
and overwhelming.

The jury’s $1.3 billion award was therefore reasonable,

especially viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to Oracle and drawing
all reasonable inferences in Oracle’s favor, and the district court should not have
substituted its view of that evidence for that of the jury.
As the parties prepared for a second trial, the district court again erred in
issuing a series of rulings improperly limiting the evidence Oracle could present,
leading Oracle to agree with SAP to stipulate to a final judgment in the amount of
$306 million in order to permit this appeal. This Court should reverse and reinstate
the jury’s verdict, or at minimum, vacate and remand for an unconditional new trial
in which damages may be valued by a hypothetical license measure.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the stipulated final
judgment as to which Oracle preserved its right to appeal. See, e.g., U.A. Local
342 Apprenticeship & Training Trust v. Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co., 396 F.3d

2
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1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005). On August 31, 2012, Oracle filed a timely Notice of
Appeal from the final judgment entered on August 3, 2012. ER97-98.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether the district court erred in granting SAP post-trial judgment as

a matter of law on hypothetical license damages for admitted copyright
infringement, where (a) such damages do not depend upon actual willingness to
license or “benchmark” licenses; and (b) Oracle presented overwhelming objective
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the fair market value of
a license for SAP’s infringing use was $1.3 billion.
2.

Whether the district court erred in ordering a new trial limited to lost

profits and infringer’s profits if Oracle rejected a $272 million remittitur, where (a)
Oracle presented overwhelming objective evidence from which a reasonable jury
could conclude that the fair market value of a license for SAP’s infringing use was
$1.3 billion; (b) the district court imposed its additional prerequisites to
hypothetical license damages only after the jury had returned its verdict; and (c)
the remittitur was set below the maximum amount sustainable by the proof.
3.

Whether, in any new trial, Oracle should be able (a) to recover actual

damages and infringer’s profits; (b) to present evidence of SAP’s saved research
and development costs; (c) to exclude SAP’s evidence of overhead expenses; and

3
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(d) to exclude testimony by SAP’s damages expert that was unreliable and outside
his expertise.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Oracle filed its complaint against SAP in March 2007 (D.E.1) and filed the
operative Fourth Amended Complaint in August 2009 (ER1361-1435). Oracle
asserted ten claims against SAP under the Copyright Act, the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, and state law. ER1411-31. 1 With respect to the copyright claim,
Oracle alleged that SAP had infringed 120 copyright registrations on Oracle
software and related support materials, and sought both actual damages and
“profits attributable to the infringement not taken into account in computing actual
damages” under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). ER1418.
In August 2009, SAP filed the first of two motions for partial summary
judgment, arguing that Oracle was not entitled to seek hypothetical license
damages on its copyright claim. D.E.447. In January 2010, the district court
denied the motion. ER1293. In August 2010, the district court largely denied
SAP’s second partial summary judgment motion, but did rule that hypothetical
license damages could not encompass any research and development costs that
SAP saved as a result of the infringing conduct. ER93-94.

1

The non-copyright claims are not at issue on appeal.
4
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In September 2010, the district court issued its Final Pretrial Order, which,
among other things, denied Oracle’s Daubert motion to exclude SAP damages
expert Stephen Clarke. ER69.
Immediately prior to trial, TN stipulated to liability on all claims (ER1238)
and SAP AG and SAP America stipulated to liability for contributory copyright
infringement (ER1236), with each reserving its defenses to damages. Following a
thirteen-day damages trial on the copyright claims in November 2010 featuring 28
witnesses and 190 exhibits, a jury concluded that actual damages should be
measured by the fair market value of a hypothetical license rather than by lost
profits, and awarded Oracle $1.3 billion in actual damages. ER161. In September
2011, the district court granted SAP’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law (“JMOL”) with respect to hypothetical license damages (ER26-36), as well as
SAP’s motion for a new trial, the latter conditioned on Oracle’s rejection of a $272
million remittitur (the “JMOL/New Trial Order”) (ER36-40).
Oracle moved for a stay of proceedings pending the filing and disposition of
a motion to certify the JMOL/New Trial Order for interlocutory appeal. D.E.1086.
The district court denied the stay (the “Stay Order”) (ER19) and, later, the request
for certification (D.E.1103). In denying the stay, the district court sought to clarify
its JMOL ruling. ER20.

5
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Oracle rejected the remittitur in February 2012 (ER160), and the parties
proceeded toward a second trial. Oracle moved to clarify whether it could present
evidence of hypothetical license damages (D.E.1120), to exclude certain evidence
regarding cost reductions relevant to measuring infringer’s profits (D.E. 1145), and
to exclude testimony by SAP expert Clarke (id.). The court denied each motion.
ER12-13, ER18.
The parties thereafter stipulated to the entry of judgment in Oracle’s favor in
the amount of $306 million. ER4. The final stipulated judgment, as to which
Oracle reserved its right to appeal, was entered in August 2012. ER1.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Oracle’s And SAP’s Competition In The Enterprise Software
Industry

Oracle and SAP are long-time competitors in the enterprise software
industry, although SAP is “a much larger company in the applications segment.”
ER185, ER189-90. Oracle devotes “massive” resources to the “long and arduous
process” of developing software designed to help customers manage and grow
their businesses (ER178-79, ER280, ER1376), funding its research and
development through license and maintenance fees that customers pay to obtain
technical support and software updates (ER179, ER166).
In January 2005, Oracle completed an $11 billion acquisition of PeopleSoft
(ER343-44), giving it access to PeopleSoft’s 9,920 customers (ER306-07),

6
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including those from PeopleSoft’s prior acquisition of J.D. Edwards. Oracle thus
nearly doubled its share of the enterprise applications market (ER186, ER366-68,
ER926) and could now “aggressively challenge SAP for leadership in business
software solutions” (ER1002). Oracle based its acquisition price on a model that
reasonably assumed retention of nearly 90% of PeopleSoft customers and receipt
of the accompanying support/update revenue stream for at least ten years. ER19596, ER309, ER1133, ER1159-1162. Oracle anticipated earning $5.4 billion from
PeopleSoft customers in the first four years alone.

ER146-47, ER297-98,

ER1162.1.
B.

SAP’s Acquisition Of TomorrowNow With Knowledge Of Its
Infringement

In response to Oracle’s acquisition, SAP devised a “dramatic, marketchanging” plan to mount “an immediate and serious challenge to Oracle” through
the acquisition of TN (ER903, ER252, ER661-62), which—enabled by its massive
illicit copying of PeopleSoft and J.D. Edwards software—provided half-price
software maintenance to and updates of PeopleSoft and J.D. Edwards software
applications (ER737-38).

SAP’s top executives considered TN a “strategic

weapon against Oracle” (ER881, ER687) and the “cornerstone” of its so-called
“Safe Passage program,” which was designed to recruit PeopleSoft and J.D.
Edwards customers (ER678, ER663-64, ER685, ER881, ER888, ER902-06) with
the “number one single-minded ambition” of converting them to SAP’s competing
7
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software (ER510-11; see also ER789-99, ER881, ER733, ER245-48, ER221).
SAP acknowledged that it could not achieve this ambition without TN: SAP’s
“market research show[ed] that [TN] [was] the only meaningful North American
provider of third party PeopleSoft maintenance services.”

ER820.

As SAP

America Director Werner Brandt acknowledged at trial, “[TN] was the only
company in North America that had the capacity to do what SAP wanted done.”
ER246-47.
The SAP Executive Board acquired TN with full knowledge that “there
could be substantial legal issues with TomorrowNow’s service delivery processes.”
ER266; see also ER252, ER255. The Board knew that TN had no research and
development department (ER268, ER1049), knew that TN owned no relevant
intellectual property (ER893), commissioned an investigation that concluded that it
was “very likely that TomorrowNow is using the software outside the contractual
use rights granted to them” (ER784), and reviewed a report warning that “the
access rights to the PeopleSoft software is very likely to be challenged by Oracle”
(ER824, ER265). SAP nonetheless acquired TN “with the knowledge that there
was a risk that Oracle would sue” (ER704-05, ER656-57) and retained TN’s
corporate existence in the hope that it would act as a “liability shield” (ER825).
SAP devised a strategy for TN to continue offering software maintenance to
customers of PeopleSoft and J.D. Edwards at half the price Oracle did, which

8
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allowed SAP to gain support revenues for TN in the short term and substantially
greater revenues for itself in the long term by tying discounted support on
PeopleSoft and J.D. Edwards software to a deal that transitioned those customers
to SAP licenses and SAP support. ER243, ER705-06, ER746, ER761-62, ER76476, ER861-63, ER874, ER902-06, ER979, ER1134, ER1167-70. According to a
December 23, 2004 “Roadmap for PSFT Customers to SAP,” unanimously
adopted by the SAP Executive Board, SAP projected that it would earn $897
million in revenue in just three years from offering TN’s maintenance service and
converting part of that customer base. ER678-79, ER699-700, ER799. SAP
further understood that, by diverting Oracle’s new PeopleSoft and J.D. Edwards
customers to TN’s half-price support offering, it would deprive Oracle of revenues
Oracle could have used to pay for the PeopleSoft acquisition and to invest in
research and development, and, accordingly, “contain Oracle’s potential growth in
the next generation application market.”

ER903; see ER251-52, ER674-75,

ER705-06, ER861.
SAP thus calculated TN’s financial benefit to SAP as far exceeding the mere
amount of support revenues SAP obtained. In April 2006, for example, SAP
estimated that:
Every $1 of 2005 closed [TN] business typically represents…
1. $2 taken from Oracle’s annual maintenance

9
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2. $20 taken away from any 10-year maintenance-based justification
for the PeopleSoft/JDE takeover
3. $10 increase to SAP’s strategic license revenue pipeline.
ER1158; see ER878 (“Over the long term, every $1 of TN Stand-alone revenue
this year represents $18 of originally expected Oracle revenue from their
misguided acquisition strategy.”).
C.

SAP’s Massive Copyright Infringement

The warnings to SAP’s board were correct: as is now undisputed, TN built
its entire business upon unlicensed downloads and copies of Oracle’s copyrighted
software and support materials. This downloading was massive in scope and
essential to TN’s business model. Oracle’s technical expert, Kevin Mandia, found
over 10 million downloaded Oracle files on TN’s systems—some five terabytes of
material. ER494. Mandia also found evidence of “about 7,100 or more copies of
Oracle applications software and Oracle database software,” some 10 terabytes,
that had been on TN’s servers. ER496-97.2 To create these copies, TN obtained
installation CDs and DVDs from its customers, copied them onto its computers,
used passwords to illicitly download software and software updates from Oracle’s
websites, and used that software to develop and test fixes and updates to Oracle
software using a significant amount of Oracle’s own code. ER506, ER749-54.
2

“Database software” refers to Oracle’s Relational Database Management
System, which was used by customers running PeopleSoft on an Oracle database.
See ER236-37, ER560-61.
10
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SAP took no steps to ensure that TN stopped infringing. ER264-65, ER71215, ER717. After Oracle acquired Siebel Systems for $6.1 billion in 2006,3 SAP
expanded TN’s service offering to Siebel products even though it knew doing so
entailed further illicit use because “at that time, [TN] didn’t have any people at all
who had any experience with Siebel software.” ER269.
In November 2006, an Oracle employee noticed suspicious downloads and
Oracle’s prompt investigation quickly identified unauthorized downloads on a
massive scale. ER169-72. Oracle filed this action in March 2007, but SAP
stopped TN’s infringing conduct only a year later and only after SAP could not
find a buyer for TN. ER258, ER514-18, ER754. TN closed in October 2008.
ER175.
D.

The Pre-Trial Proceedings
1.

The Summary Judgment Rulings

SAP filed two motions for partial summary judgment seeking to limit the
damages available to Oracle. First, SAP sought a ruling that Oracle was not
entitled to pursue hypothetical license damages on the copyright claim on the
ground that “the undisputed evidence shows that, but for infringement, the parties
never would have entered into a license for the copyrighted material at issue.”

3

Oracle’s Siebel acquisition model projected that it would receive $500
million in annual maintenance revenue from 4,000 acquired Siebel customers.
ER1132 (D.E.1058-36), ER315-16, ER449-50.
11

Case: 12-16944

12/10/2012

ID: 8432934

DktEntry: 11

Page: 22 of 74

ER1293. The district court denied the motion, ruling that Oracle was “not required
to prove that it would have successfully negotiated a license with SAP” and that
Oracle was not “precluded from seeking license damages simply because it has
never before licensed what SAP infringed.” ER1296. The court explained that the
pertinent question for calculating hypothetical license damages “is not what Oracle
would have charged for a license, ‘but what is the fair market value.’” ER1297
(quoting Davis v. The Gap, 246 F.3d 152, 166 (2d Cir. 2001)).
Second, SAP sought partial summary judgment on certain claims and
damages theories, arguing, among other things, that Oracle was not entitled to
recover development costs that SAP saved as a result of the infringing conduct.
D.E.813 (refiled D.E.640). The district court granted summary judgment to SAP
on this issue, analyzing “whether plaintiffs are entitled to recoup all their research
and development costs as actual damages for defendants’ infringement” (ER93)
(emphasis added), rather than considering whether SAP’s saved research and
development costs were relevant to determining the fair market value of a
hypothetical license.4

4

In a footnote, the district court also stated that Oracle’s calculations of
saved development costs were speculative because there was no evidence of what
SAP would have spent (ER94 n.5), disregarding that Oracle in fact sought to
present just such evidence (ER1323, ER1333).
12
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The Denial Of Oracle’s Daubert Motion

The district court also denied Oracle’s motion to exclude SAP’s damages
expert Stephen Clarke. Oracle contended in its motion and again at trial that (1)
Clarke was not qualified to opine on why customers left Oracle since his
background was in accounting, not consumer behavior; (2) Clarke likewise was not
qualified to opine on whether viable alternatives existed in the market absent TN;
and (3) Clarke’s methodology for determining viable alternatives was unreliable
since it was based solely on Internet research. D.E.781; ER58-63. The district
court rejected these arguments, concluding that they went only to the weight of the
testimony. ER69; see ER58, ER63-64, ER1264.
E.

The Damages Trial Following SAP’s Stipulation To Liability

Immediately prior to trial, TN “stipulate[d] to all liability on all claims” and
SAP AG and SAP America “stipulate[d] to vicarious liability on the copyright
claims against TN in their entirety.” ER1239. Specifically, TN admitted that it
“copied millions of updates and support materials for [J.D. Edwards], PeopleSoft,
and Siebel by downloading them from Oracle’s websites [onto] [TN’s] computers”
and “further copied certain portions of those materials” internally. ER506. SAP
AG and SAP America also stipulated that they are liable for contributory
infringement (ER1237), admitting that “they knew or had reason to know of the
infringing activity of [TN]; and … they intentionally materially contributed to the

13
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infringing activity” (ER507). SAP, however, retained its defenses to damages.
ER1239-40.5
At trial, Oracle’s damages presentation focused on the fair market value of a
hypothetical license for TN’s infringing use that Oracle and SAP might have
negotiated in January 2005 and, with respect to Siebel, in September 2006.
Oracle’s damages expert, Paul Meyer, provided extensive testimony regarding the
substantial contemporaneous evidence admitted at trial, including financial
modeling and top-level business strategy on both sides, that would have driven
such negotiations. ER324-78, ER385-452, ER456-63. Meyer applied established
valuation methodology to that evidence, opining that, at a hypothetical negotiation,
the parties would have agreed that the fair market value of SAP’s use of Oracle’s
copyrighted software was at least $1.656 billion: $1.5 billion for PeopleSoft, $100
million for Siebel, and $56 million for the Oracle Database. ER430-32, ER451-52,
ER460-62. Although SAP’s expert Clarke offered lower figures, he agreed that,
given TN’s sweeping use of Oracle’s copyrighted materials, the hypothetical
license would have had to allow “virtually unlimited copies of Oracle’s software
whenever [SAP and TN] needed.” ER602-03, ER1187.

5

In an effort to streamline the trial, the parties agreed that Oracle would not
seek monetary relief on the non-copyright claims. ER1247.
14
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Oracle’s expert Meyer also provided measures of Oracle’s lost profits and
SAP’s infringer’s profits, reasoning that, through 2015, defections would cause
Oracle to suffer $120.7 million in lost profits and give SAP $288 million in
illegitimate infringer’s profits. ER436-37, ER468-82, ER488-89. These numbers
rested on the conclusion that SAP’s infringing use of Oracle’s copyrighted
materials had helped to cause 253 out of 358 customers to leave Oracle for SAP
and 66 out of 86 customers who purchased software in addition to support from
SAP to do so. ER293-94, ER472-73, ER478-81. Meyer used the 2015 date to
reflect the fact that customers who signed with a competitor were unlikely to
return: “[W]hen a customer leaves, it doesn’t come back, you break the service,
you lose the relationship.” ER476. Meyer also calculated, in the alternative, that if
the impact of the infringement ceased when SAP closed TN in 2008, Oracle had
suffered $36 million in lost profits while SAP obtained $236 million in infringer’s
profits. ER436, ER468. Both lost profits figures would have been much higher
had the district court not ruled pre-trial that Oracle’s measure of lost profits was
limited to software support services diverted from Oracle to TN. See ER1335-36;
D.E.532.6

6

The ruling precluded Oracle from offering evidence of substantial lost upsell transactions (i.e., upgrades) and cross-sell opportunities (i.e., sales of
additional services to an existing customer) attributable to SAP’s infringement; lost
profits related to customers that did not become customers of TN (e.g., discounts
given in response to TN, and the abandonment of contractually scheduled price
15
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Instructed to determine which measure of damages would best compensate
Oracle—Oracle’s lost profits or a hypothetical license—the jury chose the latter
and assessed the value of such a license at $1.3 billion. ER161. The jury did not
consider whether to additionally award non-duplicative infringer’s profits, as the
district court declined (ER161) over Oracle’s objection (ER631-34) to instruct the
jury that Oracle could recover both.
F.

The District Court’s Post-Trial Rulings
1.

The JMOL And New Trial Order

Following the jury’s verdict, SAP renewed its JMOL motion on hypothetical
license damages and also moved for new trial. The district court granted both
motions, conditioning the latter on Oracle’s rejection of a remittitur to $272
million.
The JMOL decision rested on two grounds. First, while acknowledging that
this Court “has never explicitly held that hypothetical [license] damages are not
available absent actual proof that the plaintiff would have licensed the infringed
work to the defendant or a third party for the specific use at issue” (ER33), the
district court ruled that, “to establish its entitlement to recover hypothetical license
damages, Oracle was required to show that, but for infringement, the parties would
have agreed to license the use of the copyrighted works at issue.” ER31; contra
increases); and expenses incurred in order to respond to TN (e.g., the early
adoption of Oracle’s Lifetime Support and Applications Unlimited programs).
16
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ER1296 (ruling at summary judgment that no such proof was required). The court
concluded that Oracle had not satisfied that burden because it “offered no evidence
of the type on which plaintiffs ordinarily rely to prove that they would have
entered into such a license, such as past licensing history or a plaintiff’s previous
licensing practices.” ER31-32.
Second, the district court ruled that “the evidence Oracle presented was
insufficient to establish an objective non-speculative license price.” ER32; contra
ER1296 (ruling at summary judgment that no such proof was required). The court
stated that the hypothetical license price must be “established through objective
evidence of benchmark transactions, such as licenses previously negotiated for
comparable use of the infringed work, and benchmark licenses for comparable uses
of comparable works.” ER32. The court concluded that, because “Oracle failed to
present evidence of benchmark licenses,” it “cannot recover a lost license fee
award.” ER32; see also ER35 (similar).
The district court also granted SAP a new trial, limited to lost profits and
infringer’s profits, on the ground that the jury’s verdict was “contrary to the weight
of the evidence.” ER38. This ruling rested on the JMOL decision and the court’s
view that Oracle had presented insufficient evidence of hypothetical license
damages:
Rather than providing evidence of SAP’s actual use of the copyrighted
works, and [an] objectively verifiable number of customers lost as a
17
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result, Oracle presented evidence of the purported value of the
intellectual property as a whole, elicited self-serving testimony from
its executives regarding the price they claim they would have
demanded in an admittedly fictional negotiation, and proffered the
speculative opinion of its damages experts, which was based on little
more than guesses about the parties’ expectations.
ER38.
The district court conditioned the new trial on Oracle’s rejection of a
remittitur to $272 million. ER38. This amount reflected the $36 million in lost
profits and $236 million in infringer’s profits calculated by Oracle’s damages
expert Meyer through 2008, disregarding his calculation of $120.7 million in lost
profits through 2015 and finding his calculation of $288 million in infringer’s
profits “unduly speculative.” ER40.
Oracle moved to certify the JMOL/New Trial Order for interlocutory appeal
and for a stay pending disposition of that motion. D.E. 1085. The district court
denied the stay, sua sponte “clarify[ing]” that its previous order “did not hold as a
matter of law” that hypothetical license damages “are available only if the
copyright owner provides evidence of actual licenses it entered into or would have
entered into for the infringed works, and/or actual ‘benchmark’ licenses entered
into by any party for comparable use of the infringed or comparable works,” but
instead had ruled:
that evidence provided by Oracle was not sufficient to support an
award of hypothetical license damages because it failed to provide
objective evidence of what a willing buyer would have paid, and
18
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because it failed to provide evidence sufficient to allow the jury to
assess fair market value without undue speculation.
ER20.
2.

The Rulings
Remittitur

Following

Oracle’s

Rejection

Of

The

In February 2012, Oracle rejected the remittitur, seeking instead “to
vindicate the verdict of the jury and Oracle’s intellectual property rights as a
copyright owner.” ER160. Oracle moved to clarify that, in the second trial, it
could present evidence of hypothetical license damages. D.E.1120 The district
court denied the motion, restricting Oracle to proof of lost profits and infringer’s
profits. ER18. Oracle thereafter submitted an offer of proof as to the hypothetical
license evidence that it would have presented in a second trial. ER108-58.
In preparation for the second trial, Oracle also filed several motions in limine
regarding lost profits and infringer’s profits. As relevant here, Oracle sought to
preclude SAP from introducing evidence regarding deductions of overhead
expenses from SAP’s infringer’s profits, arguing that such deductions were not
available to willful infringers. D.E.1145, at 15-16. The district court denied the
motion. ER13. Oracle also renewed its motion to exclude testimony by SAP
expert Clarke. D.E.1145, at 2-11. The district court denied that motion as well,
relying on its prior rulings. ER12.
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The Stipulated Judgment

As the second trial approached, the parties engaged in extensive courtsponsored mediation that led to an agreement in which they stipulated to the entry
of a $306 million judgment in Oracle’s favor. ER4. In the stipulation, Oracle
contended that, but for the limitations established by the district court’s rulings, its
recovery in a new trial would be greater than $306 million. ER5. The parties also
expressly reserved their rights to appeal. ER6. After judgment was entered (ER1),
Oracle appealed and SAP cross-appealed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should vacate the judgment and remand the case to the district
court with directions to enter judgment in favor of Oracle in the amount $1.3
billion. The jury’s award of hypothetical license damages, which are a longaccepted measure of actual damages under the Copyright Act, was supported by
overwhelming, contemporaneous evidence, and the district court overreached in
substituting its view of the evidence for that of the jury.
1.

The district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law under Rule

50(b) on hypothetical license damages rests on at least three errors. First, contrary
to the district court’s ruling, the parties’ actual willingness to license is not a
prerequisite to an award of hypothetical license damages, which assume the
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existence of both a willing buyer and a willing seller, and provide a tool for
measuring the fair market value of the infringing use.
Nor, second, is evidence of “benchmark” licensing practices necessary to
support an award of hypothetical license damages. Such a requirement would both
contradict a copyright holder’s right not to license his works and conflict with
valuation of royalty rates in the analogous patent context, which does not require
reliance on “benchmark” transactions.
Third, the district court erred in setting aside the jury’s verdict on the ground
that no reasonable juror could have valued a hypothetical license for SAP’s use of
Oracle’s copyrighted materials at $1.3 billion. Oracle in fact provided a wealth of
evidence from which a rational jury could have found that a hypothetical
negotiation would have resulted in that price. That evidence included the massive
scope of SAP’s infringement (and thus of the use for which SAP would have
required a license); SAP’s own contemporaneous short-term and long-term
expected benefits from its infringement; the $11 billion sum Oracle paid for
PeopleSoft; and the parties’ own contemporaneous financial projections showing a
total expected revenue swing of nearly $2.3 billion from the use of PeopleSoft
materials alone. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Oracle and
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict, it is clear that the
verdict falls within the range of reasonable market value.
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The district court erred for similar reasons in granting a new trial

under Rule 59 limited to lost profits and infringer’s profits, as the jury’s verdict
was supported by overwhelming contemporaneous evidence of the value both
parties would have placed on SAP’s intended use of Oracle’s copyrighted
materials. But even if a new damages trial were warranted, Oracle should be
permitted in that new trial to seek hypothetical license damages, not only lost
profits and infringer’s profits. Such an unconditional new trial is appropriate
where proof of damages was found speculative, especially where the district court
changes the rules after the close of proof (here, by requiring proof of actual
willingness to license and benchmark licenses). At the very least, the remittitur
should be increased from $272 million to $408.7 million, which reflects the
maximum amount of lost profits and infringer’s profits supported by the evidence
at trial.
3.

If the Court orders a new trial and/or increases the remittitur, it should

correct the district court’s evidentiary errors to avoid tainting any further
proceedings. First, the court wrongly declined to instruct the jury that Oracle
could recover both hypothetical license damages and infringer’s profits not taken
into account in computing those damages. The Copyright Act explicitly permits
recovery of both types of awards, and this Court has recognized the same.
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Second, the district court erred by preventing Oracle from recovering SAP’s
saved research and development costs. Such costs are part of the “value of use” of
Oracle’s copyrighted materials, and are permissible evidence of hypothetical
license damages.
Third, contrary to the district court’s ruling before the second trial, SAP
should not be permitted to offer evidence of its overhead expenses in an effort to
diminish its profits from the infringement. This Court has held, at least with
respect to willful infringers (like SAP), that such expenses do not constitute
“deductible expenses” under the Copyright Act.
Finally, the district court abused its discretion in permitting SAP’s damages
expert, Stephen Clarke, to testify regarding consumer behavior and his “market
study.” Not only was Clarke unqualified to opine on such topics (his training and
experience is limited to accounting), but his opinions were unreliable since his
methodologies were either ad hoc (consumer behavior) or based solely on
unverified Internet research (“market studies”).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court “review[s] the district court’s order granting a motion for
judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 de novo,” applying the same
standard as the district court and giving the jury’s verdict the same deference as
was owed by the district court. Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., 575 F.3d 935,
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938-39 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Polar Bear Prods. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700,
708 (9th Cir. 2004) (same standard as to copyright damages). This Court also
reviews de novo a district court’s other legal rulings, including a grant of summary
judgment and jury instructions. See, e.g., Terenkian v. Republic of Iraq, 694 F.3d
1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012); Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir.
2007); Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 804 (9th Cir. 2005).
This Court reviews for abuse of discretion an order granting a new trial, see,
e.g., Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009),
as well as evidentiary rulings, see, e.g., United States v. Boulware, 384 F.3d 794,
800-01 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, reversal is appropriate only where
the trial court made an error of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact, or where
the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment.” Id. at 801 (citation and internal quotation
omitted). An erroneous exclusion of evidence is reversible if the error was not
harmless. Id. at 808.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REINSTATE THE JURY VERDICT OF $1.3
BILLION BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
ENTERING POST-TRIAL JUDGMENT THAT ORACLE’S
EVIDENCE OF ITS HYPOTHETICAL LICENSE DAMAGES WAS
INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Entry of judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) is an extraordinary

remedy that “is properly granted only if no reasonable juror could find in the nonmoving party’s favor.” Mangum, 575 F.3d at 938-39 (quotation omitted). On a
JMOL motion, a district court may not “weigh the evidence,” and “must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ... and draw all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” EEOC v. Go Daddy Software, Inc.,
581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted). The district
court’s grant of JMOL on hypothetical license damages was error under these
standards.
To begin with, this Court has long held that hypothetical license damages are
a proper measure under the Copyright Act of “the actual damages suffered by [a
copyright owner] as a result of the infringement,” 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). See, e.g.,
Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 709 (“[I]t is not improper for a jury to consider either a
hypothetical lost license fee or the value of the infringing use to the infringer to
determine actual damages, provided the amount is not based on ‘undue
speculation.’”) (quoting McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d
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557, 566 (7th Cir. 2003)); Jarvis v. K2 Inc., 486 F.3d 526, 533-35 (9th Cir. 2007)
(copyright holder entitled to recover fair market value of license that defendant did
not obtain prior to infringing use); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447
F.3d 769, 786 (9th Cir. 2006) (approving instruction defining “actual damages” as
“the amount a willing buyer would have been reasonably required to pay a willing
seller at the time of the infringement for the actual use made by the [defendant] of
the plaintiff’s work”). The purpose of hypothetical license damages is to give the
jury a tool for measuring the value of the right that has been infringed. See Wall
Data, 447 F.3d at 786; Davis, 246 F.3d at 172; see also 2 GOLDSTEIN

ON

COPYRIGHT, § 14.1.1.1(b) (noting that such damages represent a value between the
minimum that a reasonable seller would have demanded and the maximum that a
reasonable buyer would have been willing to pay).
Moreover, the evidence clearly supported a rational jury’s conclusions that
Oracle’s actual damages were best measured by the value of a hypothetical license
and that such a license was worth $1.3 billion.
A.

The District Court Erred In Requiring Evidence Of Actual
Willingness To License Or “Benchmark” Licenses To Support
Hypothetical License Damages

Contrary to the district court’s post-trial JMOL/New Trial Order (ER22-41)
(later partially disclaimed by the court’s Stay Order sua sponte clarifying the
original order) (ER19-21)), hypothetical license damages do not require a plaintiff
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to establish that it actually would have licensed the defendant or to prove the
existence of any comparable third-party “benchmark” licenses.
1.

An Award Of Hypothetical License Damages Does Not
Require Proof Of Actual Willingness To License

Because hypothetical license damages measure injury to the value of the
plaintiff’s intellectual property by assuming the existence of both a willing buyer
and a willing seller, e.g., Davis, 246 F.3d at 171-72; Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 786,
such a measure does not require proof of actual willingness to license. To the
contrary, “whether the infringer might in fact have negotiated with the owner or
purchased at the owner’s price is irrelevant to the purpose of the test.” Davis, 246
F.3d at 171-72 (emphasis added); see also McRoberts, 329 F.3d at 567
(defendant’s argument that it would not have chosen to license the copyrighted
materials “misses the point”).
The district court thus erred in describing a hypothetical license as a measure
of “license fees … actually lost as a result of the infringement” (ER33 (emphasis
added)) and in ruling that Oracle could not recover hypothetical license damages
absent evidence that “the parties would have agreed to [a] license” (ER22).7 A
copyright holder is entitled not to license its work. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207, 228-29 (1990) (“[N]othing in the copyright statutes would prevent an
7

The Stay Order’s “clarification” of the JMOL/New Trial Order did not
modify this aspect of the court’s ruling. See ER31.
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author from hoarding all of his works during the term of the copyright.”); Laws v.
Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006) (similar).8 It would
turn copyright protection on its head to restrict damages to lost profits where the
copyright owner refuses to license its work—such a plaintiff would have no lost
profits to claim, and, under the district court’s reasoning, no basis for seeking a
hypothetical license, leaving the copyright owner with no actual damages remedy
at all.
The district court likewise erred in asserting that this Court has “expressly
rejected the argument that damage in the form of lost licensing opportunities may
be ‘presumed’ as a ‘natural and probable result’ of infringement.” ER33 (citing
Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 513-14 (9th Cir.
1985)). The plaintiff in Frank Music (which considered the Copyright Act of
1909, rather than the current statute) did not seek hypothetical license damages, but
instead sought lost profits on the theory that the defendant’s misappropriation of
six minutes of music effectively precluded the plaintiff from presenting its own,

8

Patent law is analogous to copyright law on this point, considering as one
relevant factor in valuing damages “[t]he licensor’s established policy and
marketing program to maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use
the invention.” Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (emphasis added), modified and aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir.
1971); see Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc. v. Globus Med., Inc., 637 F. Supp.
2d 290, 310 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (reluctance to license “weighs in favor of higher
royalty rate”).
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much longer musical theater production. Id. at 513. The plaintiff elicited evidence
regarding the income it would have received from its production, but this Court
found no clear error in the district court’s refusal, following bench trial, to allow
recovery of such damages, since the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence
of causation; namely, that the infringement had “significantly impair[ed] the
prospects for presenting a full production.” Id. In a footnote, this Court declined
to hold that lost profits should be presumed from infringement, id. at 514 n.8, but it
did not address the standard for recovering hypothetical license damages, much
less require actual lost license fees as a prerequisite to recovering such damages.
No such prerequisite exists.
2.

An Award Of Hypothetical License Damages Does Not
Require Proof Of “Benchmark” Licenses

There is likewise no requirement that a copyright holder provide evidence of
“benchmark” licenses in order to establish hypothetical license damages. See 2
GOLDSTEIN, supra, § 14.1.1.1(b) (explaining that market-value damages are
appropriate even “[w]hen a preexisting license with the infringer or a third party is
not available as a benchmark for determining actual damages”).

Such a

requirement would create unnecessary tension with the right of a copyright holder
not to license his works, see, e.g., Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228-29; Laws, 448 F.3d at
1137, by narrowing the available remedies for infringement in circumstances
where copyrights are of such value that licenses are rarely or never granted.
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The district court based its erroneous imposition of such an obligation on its
observations that a “hypothetical license price requires an ‘objective, not a
subjective’ analysis” and that “‘excessively speculative’ claims must be rejected.”
ER32 (citing, e.g., Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534; Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909, 917
(9th Cir. 2002)). But neither of these general rules regarding damages valuation
implies a rigid requirement of any particular type of proof. In analogous patent
contexts, courts assess a royalty rate between direct competitors without the aid of
any reliable comparator “benchmark” transactions, see, e.g., Georgia-Pacific, 318
F. Supp. at 1124, relying upon the plaintiff’s expected losses and the defendant’s
expected profits at the time of the hypothesized agreement as bases for estimating
the royalty, id. at 1129-32.9
To the contrary, limitation to “objective” inquiries is meant simply to head
off consideration of the value of subjective “hurt feelings” occurring as a result of
an infringement, Mackie, 296 F.3d at 916-17, or exclusive reliance on the
plaintiff’s own testimony about what he “thought he should have earned or wished
he had charged,” Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534; see also Davis, 246 F.3d at 166 (“The
question is not what the owner would have charged, but rather what is the fair
market value.”); 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra, § 14.1.1.1(b) (willing-buyer/willing-seller
9

SAP agreed at trial that Georgia-Pacific provides an appropriate valuation
framework (ER639), and its expert used that framework to value the hypothetical
license here (ER548-51).
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measure “is essentially an objective rather than a subjective measure of damages”).
And the requirement that a verdict not be “excessively speculative” is just a
restatement of the general requirement that a jury award be “sufficiently supported
by [substantial] evidence.” Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 708.
None of these concerns mandates proof of actual comparable licenses, and
many other forms of objective evidence can establish a hypothetical license
valuation that is within the “range of the reasonable market value,” id. at 709, as
the evidence overwhelmingly did here.
B.

The District Court Erred In Ruling That Oracle’s Hypothetical
License Damages Evidence Was Insufficient As A Matter Of Law

The court also erred under Rule 50(b) in overturning the jury’s verdict
insofar as it found the evidence too speculative to support the jury’s damages
figure. A district court may not set aside a copyright damages verdict that is within
“the range of the reasonable market value.” Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 709; see also
Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534-35 (affirming award of damages that “was near the center
of the range supported by the evidence); Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 786-87 (upholding
award that fell “within an acceptable range … sustainable by the proof”) (quotation
omitted); McRoberts, 329 F.3d at 567 (copyright holder “was not required to
establish the actual value [of rights infringed]; it was required only to provide
sufficient evidence of the value so that the jury did not have to resort to undue
speculation in estimating actual damages”). Viewing the evidence in the light most
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favorable to Oracle and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s
verdict, it was error to conclude that no reasonable juror could have reached the
$1.3 billion award returned below. E.g., Go Daddy, 581 F.3d at 961.
1.

Overwhelming Evidence Supports The Jury’s Valuation Of
A Hypothetical License At $1.3 Billion

The jury’s award of $1.3 billion in hypothetical license damages rested upon
numerous objective sources at trial. First, a hypothetical license between Oracle
and SAP would have taken into account the value of TN’s massive infringement.
See Thoroughbred Software Int’l, Inc. v. Dice Corp., 488 F.3d 352, 359 (6th Cir.
2007) (defendant “is liable for the unpaid license fees for all the unauthorized
copies it made, regardless of whether these copies were accessible to or used by
[its] customers”). It is undisputed that any hypothetical license here would have
authorized SAP to obtain access to millions of copyrighted files. TN had twenty
servers containing improperly downloaded or copied Oracle software, as well as
thousands of copies of installations of Oracle’s copyrighted works—a total of over
fifteen terabytes of copies of Oracle’s software (ER492-96).

Oracle’s expert

estimated that the illegal downloads alone, which totaled over five terabytes of
infringing data, would encircle the globe nine times if printed out on double-sided
paper laid end-to-end. ER495. SAP’s damages expert agreed that a license for
such sweeping use of Oracle’s copyrighted materials would have had to allow
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“virtually unlimited copies of Oracle’s software whenever [SAP and TN]
needed.” ER602-03, ER1187.
Second, any hypothetical license between Oracle and SAP also would have
taken into account SAP’s expected benefits from its use of those stolen materials.
See Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 786; Davis, 246 F.3d at 172; Thoroughbred Software,
488 F.3d at 359. As is the rule in the parallel patent-law context, and as was
agreed by both parties’ experts (ER439, ER580-81), “the negotiation must be
hypothesized as of the time infringement began,” so that the license fee is based on
“sales expectations at the time when infringement begins, … as opposed to an
after-the-fact counting of actual sales.”

Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite

Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1384-85 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also McRoberts, 329
F.3d at 566 (endorsing this rule in copyright case). Here, the jury was presented
with evidence of both SAP’s short-term expected benefits from support revenues
and its long-term expected benefits from reducing Oracle’s scale and market share.
See supra, at 13-15. By using TN to gain access to PeopleSoft’s customer base,
SAP aimed “to attack Oracle” (ER725) by “shrink[ing] Oracle’s share of the
application market and increas[ing] SAP’s share” while “contain[ing] Oracle’s
potential growth in the next generation application market.” ER251-52, ER903.
SAP aimed to “disrupt[] Oracle’s ability to pay for the [PeopleSoft] acquisition out
of cash flow” and to divert “cash flow that could otherwise be used for research
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and development.” ER252, ER675, ER705. A rational jury thus was amply
entitled to conclude that any hypothetical license would include those substantial
expected medium- and long-term benefits to SAP, far exceeding the amount of any
existing sales. ER596-98.
Third, a rational jury was entitled to consider that Oracle had just paid $11
billion, in an arm’s-length transaction, to acquire PeopleSoft and the
accompanying intellectual property that SAP and TN admittedly stole. ER190-91,
ER284-85. PeopleSoft had spent between $500-$600 million annually to develop
its software (ER311-12), and by acquiring that software and the accompanying
customer base (along with Siebel’s), Oracle expected to earn an annual income
stream of $1.7 billion in the form of the very software maintenance payments SAP
planned to divert away with the TN offering.

ER622-23, ER319.

Although

hypothetical license damages may not reflect one party’s subjective valuation of
the rights at issue, see Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534, the jury could reasonably have
considered the contemporaneous purchase price resulting from an arm’s-length
negotiation in the course of assessing the objective “amount [that] would have been
acceptable by a prudent [copyright holder] who was willing to grant a license,”
Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120; see also id. (relevant factors include, inter
alia, the licensor’s “established polic[ies],” the parties’ actual “commercial
relationship,” and the nature of the “business proposition” embodied in the
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hypothetical license); Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 709 (permitting consideration of
“background data” gleaned from expert’s consultations with plaintiff’s principals).
Fourth, the parties’ own contemporaneous financial projections—including
SAP’s projections—amply confirm the reasonableness of the jury’s award of $1.3
billion. Before acquiring TN, SAP projected that TN’s aggressive discounting
(enabled by its theft of Oracle’s copyrighted materials), would allow it to persuade
at least 3,000 PeopleSoft customers—one-third of the total customer base—to
switch to TN for maintenance services (ER799), and that SAP would be able to
convert at least 1,375 of those customers into full SAP software purchasers,
(ER799). See ER245-46; ER860; ER903 (“Our goal is to convert the majority of
the” customer base.); ER984 (SAP projecting that by 2009 it would convert 2,000
to 4,000 PeopleSoft customers to SAP); ER1173. SAP developed these projections
with “input and extensive guidance” from its Executive Board (ER1163, ER799),
in an “attempt[] to make reasonable assumptions” (ER678, ER699-700).
SAP’s own pre-infringement projections also showed that it earned an
average of $68,000 per customer per year, plus $358,000 per new customer
conversion and $86,000 per cross-sold customer (about 70% of which was profit).
ER412. Taking these projections together, Oracle expert Meyer calculated10 that,

10

Meyer used reasonable discount rates to account for the assumption that
license fees would have been paid in lump sums in 2005. ER412-13.
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SAP could have expected to earn profits of $880 million by 2008 by achieving its
minimum target of converting just 1,375 of TN’s maintenance customers to its own
software. ER410, ER415-16, ER428.11 Indeed, prior to completing the acquisition
of TN, SAP’s Executive Board approved a business model that valued the benefits
of acquiring TN as at least $897 million over the first three years alone—with
substantial benefits continuing well into the future. ER677-78, ER683, ER699700, ER733-36, ER799, ER1173.
Moreover, contemporaneous financial data shows that Oracle would have
expected an even larger negative impact on its own business from SAP’s use of the
PeopleSoft software. When Oracle made its decision to acquire PeopleSoft and its
client base, “the key justification to spend $11.1 billion” was its expert-approved
estimate that each PeopleSoft customer would return an average of $130,000
annually, 80% of which would be profit. ER301, ER297-98, ER319-20, ER81417, ER426-28.

Taking this estimate together with SAP’s contemporaneous

customer-conversion projections, Meyer calculated that Oracle would have
11

Under more aggressive assumptions, Meyer determined that SAP could
have reasonably expected to earn more than $1.22 billion if it had captured 2,000
Oracle customers (ER415-16), and that the total expected value of the converted
customers (including from cross-sell and up-sell transactions) would have been
some $2.69 billion (ER415-16). Other metrics would have given even higher
estimates of customer value. For example, the evidence showed that SAP earned
an average of $1.9 million for each of the four customers that it admits converted
to SAP as a result of TN. ER574-76. At that rate, SAP’s projected customer
conversions would have earned it between $2.6 billion and $5.7 billion.
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expected to lose at least $1.386 billion in support revenue from SAP’s use of the
PeopleSoft copyrighted materials. ER429.12
Finally, in addition to a license for the PeopleSoft copyrighted materials, the
parties also would have negotiated licenses for TN’s separate use of Oracle’s
Siebel and database software. Meyer determined that SAP would have expected to
gain between $97 million and $247 million from its use of the Siebel software, and
that Oracle would simultaneously have expected to suffer some $164 million in
negative financial impacts. ER442-43, ER451. He thus determined that the Siebel
license would have been worth at least $100 million.

ER452.

Meyer also

explained that the licensing fees for the 172 customers found to be using
unauthorized copies of Oracle’s database software would have cost SAP some
$55.6 million. ER462.
Given this data, a rational jury easily could have found the total value of the
required licenses to be $1.3 billion. A reasonable jury, for instance, could have
determined that the parties would have expected a total minimum revenue swing of
nearly $2.3 billion from the PeopleSoft materials alone—almost $900 million in
new profits to SAP in only the first three years, and nearly $1.4 billion in direct
financial impacts to Oracle. A reasonable jury likewise could have determined that

12

Under more aggressive assumptions, SAP could reasonably have
expected to earn $1.82 billion or as much as $2.46 billion. ER429-31.
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the parties would have met near the middle of that approximation, and agreed on a
price of about $1.15 billion for a license on the PeopleSoft materials.13 In addition,
a reasonable jury, following Meyer, could have concluded that SAP would have
expected to pay some $100 million for the Siebel copyrighted materials, and more
than $55 million for the database software. Together, these approximations of the
license’s value comport with the jury’s finding that SAP would have agreed to
make a $1.3 billion investment for all three licenses.
2.

The Evidence Supporting The Jury’s $1.3 Billion Award
Was Objective And Non-Speculative

The district court was incorrect to find (ER32) the overwhelming evidence
of hypothetical license damage unduly subjective or speculative.

SAP’s pre-

infringement business projections, Oracle’s arm’s-length transaction modeling, and
the parties’ contemporaneous profit and revenue projections are all forms of
evidence well within the bounds of prior decisions in the analogous patent context,
where the Federal Circuit has repeatedly applied and approved similar analyses
based on evidence comparable to the specific, contemporaneous data Oracle
introduced here. E.g., Interactive Pictures, 274 F.3d at 1385 (infringer’s “sales
expectations at the time when infringement begins” are proper “basis for a royalty
base”); Snellman v. Ricoh Co., 862 F.2d 283, 289 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming
13

Relying on the middle-of-the-road expected profit and loss scenarios,
Meyer assessed the value of the hypothetical license fee for the PeopleSoft
materials at a minimum of $1.5 billion. ER431.
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jury’s consideration of internal “document projecting [defendant’s] anticipated
sale” of infringing products in support of reasonable-royalty damages); TWM Mfg.
Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (affirming reasonableroyalty damages based on “pre-infringement internal memorandum” assessing
defendant’s anticipated profits). There is no legal basis for declining to apply this
methodology in the parallel copyright context, and the district court offered none.
Nor is there reason to conclude that the evidence failed to establish “the
range of the reasonable market value” or that the jury’s verdict did not fall within
that range. Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 709; see also supra, Part I.B.1. The jury heard
substantial expert testimony establishing a range of figures representing reasonable
valuations of the infringed intellectual property before arriving at a value at the low
end of that range. See McRoberts, 329 F.3d at 567 (relying on, inter alia, evidence
of value of copyrighted work to defendant’s business to establish range of its
market value); cf. Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534 (upholding district court’s calculation of
damages by halving average of six estimates of fair market value because award
was “well within the range of the other five estimates”).14

14

The specific, contemporaneous evidence of the value of the hypothetical
license here, which was largely derived from SAP’s own contemporaneous data,
compares favorably to the patent cases on which SAP relied in support of its
JMOL motion. For example, Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292,
1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rejected use of an abstract “rule of thumb” (insufficiently
tethered to the facts of the case) pursuant to which it was assumed that the licensee
would pay 25% of its expected profits as a royalty. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway,
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In all, there was ample evidentiary basis for the jury verdict. Particularly
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Oracle and resolving inferences
in its favor, as the district court should have, the verdict was a reasonable,
objective estimate of the value of SAP’s infringement. The jury’s $1.3 billion
verdict should be reinstated.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
GRANTING SAP A NEW TRIAL LIMITED TO LOST PROFITS
AND INFRINGER’S PROFITS AND CONDITIONED ON ORACLE’S
REFUSAL TO ACCEPT REMITTITUR TO $272 MILLION
A.

A New Trial Was Not Warranted Because The Overwhelming
Weight Of The Evidence Supported The Jury’s Verdict

Erring under Rule 59 as it had under Rule 50(b), the district court ruled that
the jury’s “$1.3 billion verdict [was] contrary to the weight of the evidence” so as
to warrant a new trial

ER38.

According to the court, Oracle’s proof was

inadequate because it relied primarily on “evidence of the purported value of the
intellectual property as a whole, … testimony from its executives regarding the
price they claim they would have demanded in an admittedly fictional negotiation,
and … the speculative opinion of its damages expert, which was based on little

Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009), recognized that parties may rely on
estimates of a product’s expected usage in determining a lump-sum royalty, but
concluded that the plaintiff in that case had identified no evidence of such
estimates. And in Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Network Solutions, Inc.,
609 F.3d 1308, 1318-22 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc.,
594 F.3d 860, 870-71 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam), plaintiffs relied primarily on
purported benchmark licenses that they could not tie to their own cases.
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more than guesses about the parties’ expectations.” Id. To the extent the court
ruled that the jury’s award of hypothetical license damages was against the weight
of the evidence so as to warrant a new trial, its cursory order runs afoul of the rule
that a court “may not grant a new trial simply because it would have arrived at a
different verdict.” Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251
F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 2001); see also S.E.C. v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1225 (9th
Cir. 2011) (new trial is warranted only where “the verdict is against the great
weight of the evidence, or it is quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously
erroneous result”). The order should be vacated.15
First, the “value of the intellectual property as a whole”—an apparent
reference to Oracle’s evidence of the prices it paid to purchase PeopleSoft and
Siebel, and to develop its own intellectual property, see D.E.1044 at 7-8—was
clearly relevant to the fair market value of a hypothetical license.

Those

contemporaneous purchase prices resulting from arm’s-length negotiations
provided objective background evidence concerning the “amount [that] would have
been acceptable by a prudent [copyright holder] who was willing to grant a
license.” Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120; see also supra, Part I.B.1. More
important, the same model underpinned both Oracle’s decision to pay $11 billion
15

To the extent the district court ruled that there was insufficient evidence
of lost profits and infringers’ profits to support a $1.3 billion verdict, Oracle does
not contest that ruling.
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for PeopleSoft and Oracle’s expert’s analysis of the financial impact that Oracle
would have expected from the loss of exclusive access to the infringed copyrights.
For example, Meyer valued the hypothetical license using Oracle’s documented
average support revenue per customer of $130,000, Oracle’s 3.5% expected
customer attrition rate, and Oracle’s expected profit margin, all taken from the
same valuation model. ER426-29. The fact that Oracle actually based major
business decisions on those numbers shows that they are not speculative.
Second, the district court was likewise incorrect in ruling that Oracle
improperly relied on its executives’ testimony regarding the amount they would
have demanded for the contemplated license. The ultimate price of the license was
but one aspect of their testimony, which focused on objective factors
demonstrating the importance and value of the copyrighted worked to Oracle’s
business. Moreover, testimony as to the amount Oracle executives would demand
provided a window into what would have transpired at a hypothetical negotiation.
See Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 709; supra, Part I.B.1. The jury, moreover, did not
impermissibly base its verdict on the amount Oracle “wished [it] had charged,”
Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534, as evidenced by the fact that the verdict is a small fraction
of Oracle’s acquisition costs and the amounts its executives said they would have
demanded. ER204-05, ER287-89.
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Third, the district court repeated the same errors that it had committed in
granting JMOL when it asserted that the financial evidence of the value of a
hypothetical license was “speculative” and grounded in “little more than guesses
about the parties’ expectations.” ER38. As explained in Part I.B, supra, the $1.3
billion verdict was supported by substantial, contemporaneous evidence of the
value both parties would have placed on SAP’s intended use of Oracle’s
copyrights—not just the value of the acquired companies or the intellectual
property in the abstract. Both parties relied on that data in making extraordinarily
important business decisions—Oracle in spending $11 billion to purchase
PeopleSoft; SAP in undertaking a plainly illegal course of conduct and exposing
itself to substantial liability. The parties would have relied on the same models in
determining the price for a hypothetical license, and their expectations at the time
of licensing are the legally salient data point, see McRoberts, 329 F.3d at 566;
Interactive Pictures, 274 F.3d at 1384-85. Oracle’s expert neither guessed about
his data nor had any need to do so—he was instead able to rely on SAP’s own
contemporaneous projections and revenue figures, as well as Oracle’s own
contemporaneous valuation of its business, all of which were admitted into
evidence at trial.16

16

The jury properly rejected SAP’s competing $40.6 million valuation of a
hypothetical license, which was based on a “running royalty” model rather than an
up-front lump sum. ER526, ER577. SAP’s expert took into account only the
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Contrary to the court’s generalized contention that the verdict exceeds what
the evidence will bear, the jury’s verdict did not exceed the actual harm to Oracle
and its intellectual property. The very premise of hypothetical license damages is
that such an award measures the injury to the value of the subject works, see, e.g.,
Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 786; Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 708; Davis, 246 F.3d at 172,
and the evidence here established that the value of a license (and thus of the
misappropriated intellectual property) fell in a range encompassing the jury’s
verdict. See supra, Part I.B.1. The jury’s well-supported verdict should stand.
B.

Even If A New Trial On Damages Were Warranted, It Should
Have Been Unconditional

The district court should have granted an unconditional new trial on
damages at most, even if Oracle’s hypothetical license damages evidence had been
speculative. Under Rule 50(b), a district court may order a new trial instead of
directing entry of judgment as a matter of law, Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co.,
330 U.S. 212, 215 (1947), where proof of damages is speculative, see, e.g.,
McClaran v. Plastic Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 347, 354, 356-57, 364 (9th Cir. 1996)
(ordering new damages trial in lieu of JMOL); Whitserve, LLC v. Computer

customers that SAP actually succeeded in poaching from Oracle, and the jury
could reasonably have concluded that hypothetical negotiating parties would have
based the license fee on the number and kind of copies to be made and the uses to
which they would be put—rather than what SAP actually wound up achieving
through its infringement. See, e.g., Wall Data, 447 F.3d at 775 & n.3; Polar Bear,
384 F.3d at 709; Davis, 246 F.3d at 172; Interactive Pictures, 274 F.3d at 1385.
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Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 33-34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (same); Hidden Oaks Ltd. v.
City of Austin, 138 F.3d 1036, 1051-52 (5th Cir. 1998) (same). The district court
abused its discretion by not taking the same step.
This is especially so here because the district court changed the rules after
the close of proof. Prior to the JMOL/New Trial Order, the district court had never
held that hypothetical license damages require proof of actual willingness to
license or benchmark licenses; to the contrary, the court had rejected both of these
propositions in its prior rulings. ER642-43; ER652-54; ER1296-97. Judgment as
a matter of law may be granted only “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue,”
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1), and a “major purpose” of a motion under this rule is “to
call the claimed deficiency in the evidence to the attention of the court and to
opposing counsel at a time when the opposing party is still in a position to correct
the deficit.” Waters v. Young, 100 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996) (quotation
omitted). “In no event … should the court enter judgment against a party who has
not been apprised of the materiality of the dispositive fact and been afforded an
opportunity to present any available evidence bearing on that fact.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 50 adv. comm. n. (1991), quoted in Waters, 100 F.3d at 1441. Oracle was not
“fully heard” because the district court gave it no notice of the evidentiary
requirements it would ultimately impose. Accordingly, the proper remedy would
have been to order an unconditional new trial at which Oracle could present
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evidence to satisfy any newly imposed evidentiary burden, and any new trial order
should be modified to allow proof of hypothetical license damages.
C.

At The Very Least, The Remittitur Should Be Increased To
$408.7 Million

Even if the district court were correct to enter judgment as a matter of law on
hypothetical license damages (which it was not), and to limit its new trial order to
evidence of lost profits and infringer’s profits (which it likewise was not), it still
abused its discretion in selecting the amount of its remittitur. A remittitur (if
given) must be in “the maximum amount sustainable by the proof.” D&S RediMix v. Sierra Redi-Mix & Contracting Co., 692 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 1982).
This rule prevents a district court from violating the Seventh Amendment by
substituting its own judgment for that of the jury. See 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, FED.
PRAC. & PROC. § 2815 & n.19. Remittitur to an amount below the maximum that
the evidence can reasonably sustain is thus an error of law and ipso facto an abuse
of discretion. See McCabe v. Parker, 608 F.3d 1068, 1082 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding
an error of law and thus “a clear abuse of discretion” where “[t]he amounts
selected by the district court are inconsistent with the maximum recovery rule”);
see generally Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d
1422, 1426 (9th Cir. 1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion
when it makes an error of law.”).
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The district court’s remittitur runs afoul of this rule. Assuming arguendo
that hypothetical license damages are unavailable, the “maximum amount” of
damages supported by the evidence at trial is the $120.7 million in lost profits plus
$288 million in infringer’s profits ($408.7 million total) that Meyer’s testimony
established.

ER436-37, ER468-82, ER488-89.

These calculations reasonably

estimated the ongoing effects of SAP’s infringements until 2015.

Instead of

accepting this maximum amount, as it was bound to do, the court adopted Meyer’s
alternative calculations of $36 million in lost profits and $236 million in infringer’s
profits ($272 million total), under a fictional scenario in which profits and losses
from SAP’s misappropriation of Oracle’s property suddenly ceased when SAP
closed TN in 2008. ER18, ER471, ER489. While the jury might have been free to
choose this lesser amount, the district court was not.
The court’s rationales for rejecting Meyer’s testimony do not withstand even
minimal scrutiny. First, the court incorrectly asserted that “Oracle provided no
evidence to support an additional $84.7 million [in lost profits] for ‘ongoing
impact’ for seven years following TN’s demise.” ER40.

As Oracle executives

testified, absent infringement, Oracle’s customers would typically remain on
Oracle support for an average of ten years. ER309 (Oracle co-President and CFO
describing 10-year customer relationships as “conservative”), ER814-16
(PeopleSoft valuation describing 10-year relationships). At the same time, as
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Meyer testified, the expense and inconvenience of changing service providers
means that losing a client (or gaining one) is relatively permanent: “[W]hen a
customer leaves, it doesn’t come back, you break the service, you lose the
relationship.” ER476. From this common-sense observation, a jury could have
inferred that even though the infringement ended in 2008, SAP would hold onto
(and Oracle would continue to be deprived of) the customers SAP had been able to
lure away on account of its earlier infringement.

There was thus a clear

evidentiary basis from which a jury might reasonably have concluded that Oracle
would continue to endure damages after 2008.
Second, the district court asserted, without support, that “Meyer’s
justification for the larger calculation of infringer’s profits is unduly speculative.”
ER40. But this too is mistaken. As Meyer explained, his $288 million calculation
of SAP’s profits from infringement is based on an examination of the 86
companies that switched from Oracle to SAP during the relevant time period. See
ER478-81. From this group, Meyer determined that twenty of the customers had
changed service providers for reasons unrelated to TN’s infringement of Oracle’s
copyrights, but that the other 66 made the switch due to the infringement. ER47276, ER478-81. Meyer then assessed the particular effects on Oracle and SAP from
each of these defections, and extrapolated that those effects would continue well
into the future. A jury could reasonably agree with this assessment of the effects
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of SAP’s infringement, and thus could have accepted Meyer’s larger lost-profits
and infringer’s-profits calculations. Since the amount of the remittitur was less
than the maximum permitted by the evidence (exclusive of hypothetical license
evidence), the district court abused its discretion.
III.

IN THE EVENT OF ANY REMAND FOR NEW TRIAL, THIS
COURT SHOULD CORRECT THE DISTRICT COURT’S LEGAL
AND EVIDENTIARY ERRORS
In the event the Court rejects the above arguments for reinstating the jury

verdict for Oracle, it should remand for a new trial in which Oracle may seek
hypothetical license damages, lost profits, and infringer’s profits without the
strictures imposed by the district court’s evidentiary errors. The district court
erroneously limited the evidence that Oracle could present in any second trial,
while permitting SAP to offer unreliable damages testimony by an unqualified
expert. Oracle should be free to prove its damages through proper evidence at any
new trial.
A.

The District Court Erred In Barring Oracle From Recovering
Both Actual Damages And Infringer’s Profits

In denying Oracle’s requested instruction that the jury could award both
actual damages in the form of hypothetical license damages and infringer’s profits,
the district court erred and in so doing prejudiced Oracle. Jury instructions “must
correctly state the law,” and “[e]ach party is … entitled to an instruction about his
or her theory of the case if it is supported by law and has foundation in the
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Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation

omitted). “In evaluating jury instructions, prejudicial error results when, looking
to the instructions as a whole, the substance of the applicable law was [not] fairly
and correctly covered.” Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 802 (9th Cir.
2001) (quotation omitted).
Section 504 of the Copyright Act explicitly permits a copyright owner to
recover both “actual damages” (to compensate it for its loss) and “any profits of
the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account
in computing the actual damages.” 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(a)(1), 504(b). The legislative
history makes clear that Congress intended to permit copyright owners to seek both
types of awards:
[S]ection 504(b) recognizes the different purposes served by awards
of damages and profits. Damages are awarded to compensate the
copyright owner for losses from the infringement, and profits are
awarded to prevent the infringer from unfairly benefiting from a
wrongful act. … [I]n cases where the copyright owner has suffered
damages not reflected in the infringer’s profits, or where there have
been profits attributable to the copyrighted work but not used as a
measure of damages, subsection (b) authorizes the award of both.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (1976); see also Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 718
(similar).
Consistent with this statutory text and purpose, this Court has held that
copyright plaintiffs may recover both actual damages and infringer’s profits. See,
e.g., Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) (“In addition to
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actual damages suffered, Abend would be entitled to profits attributable to the
infringement.”); Cream Records, Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 754 F.2d 826,
828 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating, in an appeal of an award of hypothetical license
damages plus infringer’s profits, that “the copyright owner is entitled to recover
‘any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not
taken into account in computing the actual damages’”) (quoting 17 U.S.C. §
504(b)). As the Fourth Circuit explained, both actual damages and infringer’s
profits are awarded so that “the infringer realize[s] that it is cheaper to buy than to
steal.” Walker v. Forbes, Inc., 28 F.3d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 1994).
Contrary to this well-established law, the district court ruled that “the
hypothetical license does include the infringer’s profits regardless of what
[damages] number the jury comes back with.” ER634. But, as Oracle explained,
if the jury awarded hypothetical license damages below the amount proffered by
Oracle’s expert Meyer (i.e., below $1.656 billion (ER463)), the jury would have to
determine whether that hypothetical license value included all of the infringer’s
profits. ER632-33. Without the requested instruction (ER1208), the jury never
had the opportunity to make this determination. The failure to give the legally
correct jury instruction was prejudicial because it would permit the jury to award
only an amount of actual damages that did not include all infringer’s profits. This
error should be corrected before any new trial.
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The District Court Improperly Excluded Evidence Of SAP’s
Saved Research And Development Costs

The district court also erred in ruling on SAP’s motion for partial summary
judgment that hypothetical license damages could not take into account the billions
of dollars in research and development costs that SAP would have had to incur
absent its infringement of Oracle’s intellectual property. ER93-94. That ruling
was erroneous as a matter of law, because the savings a buyer would achieve from
not having to develop a product are relevant to determine the fair market value of a
hypothetical license for that product.
This Court has long recognized an objective “value of use” measure of
actual copyright damages. Jarvis, 486 F.3d at 534; Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 708;
Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479. Saved development costs are part of the value of
infringement and thus should be included in quantifying the fair market value. See
Polar Bear, 384 F.3d at 708 (including as damages “the value of the use of the
copyrighted work to the infringer”) (quotation omitted). There is no basis to
exclude such evidence categorically and other courts have found such evidence
relevant. Harris Market Research v. Marshall Mkting. & Comm’cns, Inc. 948 F.2d
1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1991) (allowing consideration of copyright-holder’s
development costs in determining hypothetical license); Real View, LLC. v. 20-20
Techns., Inc. 811 F. Supp. 2d 553, 558-59 (D. Mass. 2011) (noting instruction that
jury “could take into account ‘any design costs that [the infringer] saved by its use
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of ... [copyrighted material]’”); cf. Bourns, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 331 F.3d 704,
709-10 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming award of saved development costs under unjust
enrichment theory where defendant had misappropriated trade secrets).
The district court initially accepted this “value of use” approach (ER1295),
but later ruled to the contrary (ER93-94). This ruling was inconsistent with the
authorities above and should be vacated in advance of any new trial.
C.

The District Court Improperly Held Admissible SAP’s Evidence
Of Overhead Expenses For Purposes Of Calculating Infringer’s
Profits

The district court also erred as a matter of law in denying Oracle’s motion in
limine, directed to the second trial, to preclude SAP from offering evidence of its
overhead expenses in an effort to lower its infringer’s profits. ER13-14. This error
too should be corrected in advance of any retrial.
Section 504(b) permits a copyright defendant to introduce evidence of
“deductible expenses” to be offset against gross revenues, so as to reach a figure
for “profits of the infringer.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). The Copyright Act, however,
does not define “deductible expenses,” and courts, including this Court, have filled
this gap by precluding willful infringers from deducting overhead costs. See, e.g.,
Frank Music, 772 F.2d at 515 (“A portion of an infringer’s overhead properly may
be deducted from gross revenues to arrive at profits, at least where the
infringement was not willful, conscious, or deliberate.”) (emphasis added); Saxon
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v. Blann, 968 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Overhead may not be deducted from
gross revenues to arrive at profits when an infringement was deliberate or
willful.”); cf. L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. Wm. Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U.S. 97, 99-100
(1928) (holding that willful infringers could not deduct income taxes), cited in
Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 487 (9th Cir. 2000). This rule
ensures that there is an adequate disincentive to infringe, as mere disgorgement of
profits—with deductions available for the cost of infringement—offers little to
dissuade a willful infringer who is necessarily taking a calculated risk.
Here, TN pled guilty to criminal copyright infringement following the first
trial.

In the plea, TN conceded that it “willfully infringed the copyrights of

Oracle’s copyrighted works … for the purpose of commercial advantage and
private financial gain.” United States v. TomorrowNow, Inc., No. 4:11-cr-642,
Plea Agreement, Dkt. No. 13, at 5:13-15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2011). In the civil
case, SAP AG and SAP America stipulated that they “intentionally materially
contributed” to TN’s willful infringement. ER507. In light of these admissions,
the district court should have precluded SAP from deducting overhead expenses
when calculating lost profits.
In denying Oracle’s motion, the district court relied on the absence of any
distinction between willful and non-willful infringers in Section 504(b), in contrast
to Section 504(c), which does distinguish between willful and non-willful
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infringers for caps on statutory damages. ER13-14. But Section 504(c) employs a
different scheme for the calculation of statutory damages than exists in Section
504(b) for the calculation of actual damages, and thus the reference to willful
infringers in Section 504(c), but not Section 504(b), sheds little light on
congressional intent. If anything, the higher cap on statutory damages for willful
infringers than non-willful infringers in Section 504(c) suggests that differences in
culpability should affect the extent to which deductions are available under Section
504(b) to ensure adequate deterrence. Thus, in any new trial, SAP should be
precluded from deducting overhead expenses when calculating infringer’s profits.
D.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Permitting Testimony
By SAP’s Damages Expert Clarke

SAP’s expert, Stephen Clarke, was not qualified to testify on the topics as to
which he opined, and his testimony was unreliable; the district court thus should
have excluded it under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which requires consideration
of whether the expert has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education on the subject matter, and under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993), which requires determination “whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying [expert] testimony is scientifically valid and …
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue.” Expert opinions “are to be admitted only if the facts or data are of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
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Id. at 595 (internal quotations omitted).

“[M]aintaining Daubert’s standards is particularly important considering the aura
of authority experts often exude, which can lead juries to give more weight to their
testimony.” Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1063-64 (9th
Cir. 2002).
1.

Clarke’s Consumer Behavior Testimony Was Unreliable
And Outside His Expertise

Over Oracle’s objection (D.E.781; D.E.1145; ER62), the district court—
without making an express determination about expert qualifications or
reliability—improperly admitted Clarke’s testimony regarding consumer behavior
as to which he lacked any expertise (ER12, ER63-65, ER69). Clarke testified that
he looked at consumer information to determine why customers left Oracle and
excluded from his analysis of lost profits and infringer’s profits consumers who
purportedly left for reasons other than switching to TN. ER59. Clarke’s consumer
behavior opinion removed 63 customers from his lost profits analysis, and 82 of 86
customers from his analysis of SAP’s infringer’s profits. ER546-47, ER565. With
respect to infringer’s profits, this represented hundreds of millions of dollars of
revenue. ER576 (Clarke subtracting $675 million in infringer’s profits).
Clarke, however, is unqualified to provide any testimony about how
customers made purchasing decisions. He has no experience, knowledge, training,
or expertise in consumer behavior or any related field. Rather, Clarke’s only
56

Case: 12-16944

12/10/2012

ID: 8432934

training and experience is in accounting.

DktEntry: 11

ER538-40.

Page: 67 of 74

Because his testimony

sought to explain why customers acted as they did, he needed expertise in
consumer behavior that he lacked. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Amy Travel Service, Inc.,
875 F.2d 564, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony
about consumer reaction to sales pitch because such testimony required expert in
consumer psychology or consumer behavior).
Clarke’s ad hoc “methodology” for excluding certain customers also was
unreliable, providing an independent basis for excluding the testimony. Clarke
admitted that he “toyed with all kinds of ways of doing this, trying to make an
appropriate judgment as to whether these customers would have left” (ER572),
apparently developing his “method” for the sole purpose of testifying in this case
(ER564-68). The absence of any discernible, testable methodology, particularly
one that was developed prior to the litigation, is a “very significant fact” that
weighs against the reliability of expert testimony.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharms, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
The district court thus abused its discretion in admitting this consumer
behavior opinion, which substantially decreased Clarke’s computation of lost
profits and infringer’s profits.

SAP should be precluded from offering this

testimony in a second trial.
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Clarke’s Market Study Testimony Was Unreliable And
Outside His Expertise

Over Oracle’s objection (D.E.781; D.E.1145; ER58), the district court also
improperly admitted Clarke’s testimony regarding “market studies.”

Clarke

opined that TN customers would have left Oracle even if TN had not existed and
that competition from other companies would have reduced the fair market value
of a hypothetical license below the amount proffered by Oracle’s expert. ER58486.
Not only was Clarke unqualified to opine on market alternatives (given his
background is limited to accounting), his opinion was based solely on Internet
research, not any reliable methodology.

Clarke merely examined website

marketing materials (ER587), and did so without determining the accuracy of that
information (ER588).

He then used that information to evaluate whether

companies in the same field would be viable competitors for PeopleSoft customers
seeking support, a matter also beyond Clarke’s expertise. ER555-57. He was also
unable to explain how he evaluated the market at the time of hypothetical license
negotiations in 2005, rather than when he prepared his expert report years later.
ER590.
Clarke’s Internet research reflects none of the hallmarks of a scientific and
verifiable method necessary to satisfy the Daubert standard. See, e.g., Kilgore v.
Carson Pirie Holdings, Inc., 205 Fed. App’x 367, 372 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming
58

Case: 12-16944

12/10/2012

ID: 8432934

DktEntry: 11

Page: 69 of 74

exclusion of expert opinion based on internet article and personal experience “was
not supported by sufficient data or reliable methodology”); Trademark Props., Inc.
v. A & E Television Networks, 2008 WL 4811461, *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 2008)
(excluding expert damages opinion that relied on a newspaper article and internet
research); In re Ameriserve Food Distrib., Inc., 267 B.R. 668, 672 (D. Del. 2001)
(“It cannot be said that internet and library research, such as here, is the type
‘experts’ customarily rely upon in forming legitimate opinions.”).
The district court thus abused its discretion in admitting such testimony, and
that error should be corrected in advance of any second trial.
CONCLUSION
The judgment should be vacated and the case remanded with directions to
enter judgment in favor of Oracle in the amount of $1.3 billion. Alternatively, the
judgment should be vacated and the case remanded either (1) for a new trial on
hypothetical license damages, lost profits, and infringer’s profits, free from the
district court’s evidentiary errors, or (2) so that Oracle may consider whether to
accept a remittitur in the amount of $408.7 million or a new trial on lost profits and
infringer’s profits, again free from the district court’s evidentiary errors.
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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees respectfully request that this Court
hear oral argument in this case.
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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
Pursuant to Circuit Rule 28-2.6, Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees
state that they are not aware of any related cases pending in this Court.
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